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COMMENTS 
NO MAN'S LANDFILL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLES 
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
IN NONHAZARDOUS SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE MANAGEMENT IN MARYLAND. 
In recent years, regulation concerning the generation, trans-
portation, and disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous solid 
waste has proliferated. Local, state and federal governments all 
have exerted varying degrees of control over this activity. This 
comment examines the framework of governmental interaction 
with regard to certain aspects of nonhazardous solid and hazard-
ous waste management. Some major legislative schemes are also 
examined to determine their impact on persons or businesses that 
may come within the ambit of statutory civil liability and/or 
criminal sanctions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which federal, state, and local governments have en-
gaged in environmental regulation is a product of the relationship be-
tween federal and state legislative powers on one level and between state 
and local legislative powers on another. Specifically, regulation of non-
hazardous solid wastes and hazardous wastes interacts on three levels: 
(1) comprehensive federal controls and programs, (2) state programs 
designed to implement the federal schemes and independent state re-
quirements and prohibitions, and (3) local zoning regulations. 
To facilitate an understanding of environmental regulation in Mary-
land, this comment first examines the system of state and local legislative 
powers that exists in Maryland. Second, the comment explores the 
framework of local, state, and federal regulatory schemes created to con-
trol the fields of nonhazardous solid waste management and hazardous 
waste management in Maryland. Finally, the comment addresses cer-
tain litigious aspects of a focal piece of federal legislation, the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
("CERCLA"). 
II. STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
IN MARYLAND 
The relationship among state legislation applicable statewide, state 
legislation applicable locally, and local governmental legislation in Mary-
land is centered on the concept of home rule. l In Maryland, various 
1. See generally Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing the State's Legislative Power 
with Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REV. 327 (1968); Comment, State and Local 
Legislative Powers: An Analysis of the Conflict and Preemption Doctrines in Mary-
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forms of home rule exist in counties and municipalities.2 Three types of 
self-governing counties exist in Maryland: (1) charter counties, estab-
lished pursuant to article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution; (2) code 
counties, established pursuant to article XI-F of the Maryland Constitu-
tion; and (3) counties without constitutional home rule, but which derive 
their powers of local self-government from the state legislature, having 
adopted neither charter nor code home rule. 3 
A. Powers Granted to Political Subdivisions 
The Maryland Constitution grants to Baltimore City and charter 
cpunties "full power to enact local laws ... including the power to repeal 
or amend local laws ... enacted by the General Assembly, upon all mat-
ters covered by the express powers granted as above provided .... "4 The 
phrase "express powers granted as above provided" refers to a provision 
of the Maryland Constitution that directs the General Assembly to pro-
vide a grant of such express powers, which shall not be enlarged or ex-
tended by any charter but which may be extended, modified, amended, 
or repealed by the General Assembly.s The powers expressly conferred 
upon charter counties pursuant to these provisions, known collectively as 
the Express Powers Act,6 include the power to zone and plan 7 and the 
land, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 300 (1979), "Home rule" is defined as a "[c]onstitutional 
provision or type of legislative action which results in providing local cities and 
towns with a measure of self government if such local government accepts terms of 
the state legislation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (5th ed. 1983). Home rule 
was developed to extricate local governmental functions from restrictions imposed 
by the application of "Dillon's Rule," which required strict construction of constitu-
tional or legislative grants of specific powers to local units of government. Moser, at 
330; see also 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911). "[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise 
the following powers. and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, 
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; 
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of 
the corporation .... " Id. (emphasis added). The term "municipal corporation" as 
used in this rule has been construed to encompass county governing bodies. See 
Montgomery County v. Maryland-Washington Metro. Dist., 202 Md. 293, 304, 96 
A.2d 353, 358 (1953) (discussing applicability of Dillon's Rule to counties). 
2. Counties and municipalities are local governmental units created by the state. 
Moser, supra note 1, at 330. The Maryland Constitution generally treats Baltimore 
City, which possesses attributes of both a county and a municipality, as an in-
dependent county for home rule purposes. Id. at 332. 
3. Municipal home rule is provided for in article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution. 
MD. CONST. art. XI-E (1981). The following counties presently have charter home 
rule: Anne Arundel County, Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Harford County, 
Howard County, Montgomery County, Prince George's County, Talbot County, 
and Wicomico County. The following counties have code home rule: Allegany 
County, Caroline County, Kent County, and Worcester County. 
4. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3 (1981). Section 3 calls for a legislative grant of express 
powers, indicating that article XI-A is not self-executing. See Moser, supra note 1, 
at 333. See generally 4 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 31A.02 (1986). 
5. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2 (1981). 
6. Hampton Assocs. v. Baltimore County, 66 Md. App. 551, 566, 505 A.2d 537, 545, 
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power to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases into the 
county. 8 Further, a catch-all provision authorizes a charter county to 
pass "such ordinances as may be deemed expedient in maintaining the 
peace, good government, health and welfare of the county."9 The state 
legislature has granted exclusively to Baltimore City "all the power com-
monly known as the police power [within the limits of the City of Balti-
more] to the same extent as the State has or could exercise such power 
within said limits .... "10 
The Maryland Constitution confers upon code counties the general 
power to enact local laws applicable to their "incorporation, organiza-
tion, or government."!! Unlike charter counties, code counties are not 
limited to certain enumerated powers.!2 Legislation supplementing the 
constitutional grant of code home rule powers, however, incorporates by 
reference the provisions of the Express Powers Act:\3 Generally speak-
ing, code counties possess broader governmental powers than do charter 
counties.!4 
Counties of the third type, operating with neither charter nor code 
home rule, derive their legislative powers from article 25 of the Maryland 
Annotated Code. Among these powers is an express authorization to 
construct landfills and to prescribe and enforce regulations concerning 
the use and operation of disposal areas or facilities.!S 
• 
These general sources of local legislative power operate in conjunc-
tion with other state provisions that impose limitations on such power. 
Principally, the powers of Baltimore City and the charter counties to 
enact locallaws!6 are subject to the Maryland Constitution and to public 
cert. denied, 307 Md. 406, 514 A.2d 24 (1986). See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 
25A, § 5 (1987) (granting express powers to all charter counties). 
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(X) (1987). 
8. Id. § 5(J) (1987). 
9. Id. § 5(S) (1987); see Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 
161,252 A.2d 242, 247 (1969) (construing section 5(S) as a general welfare clause); 
Prince George's County v. Chillum-Adelphi Fire Dep't, Inc., 275 Md. 374, 382, 340 
A.2d 265, 270 (1965) (characterizing section 5(S) as a grant of police powers). 
10. BALTIMORE CITY CHARTER art. 2, § 27 (1964). This provision is the principal dis-
tinction between Baltimore City and all other charter counties, the powers of which 
are limited to those expressly granted in article 25A of the Maryland Annotated 
Code. Broad judicial construction of article 25A, section 5(S) of the Maryland An-
notated Code, however, has reduced the significance of this distinction. See supra 
note 9, and accompanying text. 
11. MD. CaNST. art. XI-F, § 1(2) (1981) (defining "public local law," which under sec-
tion 3 of article XI-F, a code county is empowered to enact). 
12. Moser, supra note 1, at 336, 340. 
13. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25B, § 13 (1987). 
14. Moser, supra note 1, at 340. Municipalities with home rule also possess general 
rather than limited powers. Id. at 335. Legislation related to municipal home rule 
is found in articles 23A and 23B of the Maryland Annotated Code. 
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 14A (1987). 
16. As used in this article, the term "local law" means an enactment by the governmen-
tal body of a county (including Baltimore City). 
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generallaws l7 of Maryland. IS Thus, the General Assembly, by enacting 
public general laws, possesses certain preemptive powers. 19 On the other 
hand, the General Assembly is prohibited from enacting any public local 
law20 regarding any area covered by the express powers granted to char-
ter counties.21 This reservation of exclusive powers to the political subdi-
visions is critical to the viability of home rule. 
B. Preemption and Conflict 
When local legislation and public general legislation both pertain to 
the same subject matter, courts apply a two-prong analysis to determine 
which law controls. If either prong is satisfied, then the public general 
law controls. The courts examine whether state legislation has pre-
empted the particular field by occupation22 and whether the particular 
public general and local laws confiict.23 
17. The tenn "public general law" means an enactment by the state legislature that is 
applicable to more than one county. 
18. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, §§ 1, 3 (1981). Similarly, article XI-F, section 10 of the 
Maryland Constitution subjugates the local legislative powers of code counties to 
laws enacted by the General Assembly that are applicable to such counties. Perhaps 
because there are fewer code counties than there are charter counties, case law ad-
dressing the issues of preemption and conflict has developed primarily in the context 
of charter home rule. 
19. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text. 
20. The tenn "public local law" as used in this article refers solely to such law enacted 
by the state legislature, defined in article XI-A, section 4 of the Maryland Constitu-
tion as: 
Any law so drawn as to apply to two or more of the geographical subdivi-
sions of this State shall not be deemed a Local Law, within the meaning of 
this Act. The tenn "geographical sub-division" herein used shall be taken 
to mean the City of Baltimore or any of the Counties of this State. 
MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 4 (1981). By negative implication, this means that a state 
enactment applicable to only one geographical subdivision is a public local law. The 
following test detennines whether an enactment by the General Assembly is a pub-
lic local law or a public general law (defined supra note 17): If the enactment, in 
subject matter and substance, is confined in ·its operation to prescribed territorial 
limits and is equally applicable to all persons within such limits, then it constitutes a 
public local law. Steimel v. Board of Election Supervisors, 278 Md. I, 5, 357 A.2d 
386, 388 (1976); Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 435, 240 A.2d 272, 278 
(1968); see also State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 425-26, 137 A. 39,42 (1927) (assess-
ing character of state enactment as public local law by fact that subject matter of 
enactment was exclusively local). The enactment is a public general law if it con-
cerns the general public welfare, Steimel, 278 Md. at 5, 357 A.2d at 388, or if it 
fonns an integral part of an entire bi-county or multi-county scheme. State's Attor-
ney v. Mayor of Baltimore, 274 Md. 597, 607, 337 A.2d 92, 98 (1975). 
21. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 4 (1981). 
22. E.g., County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 325 A.2d 112 (1974); 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969); Heubeck v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954). 
23. E.g., Rockville Grosvenor, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 289 Md. 74,422 A.2d 353 
(1980); Heubeck v. Mayor of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954); Hennan 
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 55 A.2d 491 (1947); Rossberg v. State, III 
Md. 394,74 A. 581 (1909); Montgomery County v. Eli, 20 Md. App. 269, 315 A.2d 
136 (1974), cert. denied, 271 Md. 735 (1974). 
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With regard to the first prong, when the General Assembly enacts a 
public general law pertaining to a certain field and expresses its intent to 
preempt all or part24 of that field, parallel local legislation is pre-
empted.25 Such preemptive intent has been found either when the legis-
lature has included a standard clause expressly repealing all inconsistent 
laws26 or when the legislature has so forcibly expressed its intent to oc-
cupy a specific field of regulation that preemption is necessarily im-
plied.27 The court of appeals has recommended cautious application of 
this latter doctrine.28 Absent preemption, a public general law and a lo-
cal ordinance may co-exist even though they address the same subject 
matter, as long as there is no conflict between the twO. 29 
The second prong is derived from language in the Maryland Consti-
tution, which provides that in case of any conflict between a local law 
and a public general law, the latter shall controPo The landmark deci-
sion examining conflict between a local law and a public general law in 
Maryland is Rossberg v. State. 31 In Rossberg, the court of appeals recog-
nized that an ordinance which permits acts or occupations prohibited by 
state statute, or which prohibit acts permitted by state statute or consti-
tution, is void, but an ordinance which merely adds to the statutory 
scheme is not void. 32 Maryland courts follow the Rossberg rule in resolv-
ing questions of conflict between local legislation and public general 
legislation. 33 
24. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 226 Md. 379, 390, 174 A.2d 
153, 158 (1961) (public general law expressly preempted field with regard to corpo-
rate sureties by denying local governments power to require additional licenses from 
such businesses; absence of statutory language regulating non-corporate sureties im-
plied an intent not to preempt field with regard to non-corporate sureties.). 
25. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Mayor of Baltimore, 245 Md. 23, 
224 A.2d 883 (1966); Mayor of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 226 Md. 379, 174 
A.2d 153 (1961); Eastern Tar Prod. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Md. 290,4 
A.2d 462 (1939). 
26. Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 322, 255 A.2d 376, 385 (1969). 
27. Id. at 323, 255 A.2d at 385. In County Council for Montgomery County v. Mont-
gomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975), the court of appeals found that the 
state law regulating election finances fit squarely within the "forcible expression" 
doctrine; the county election ordinances were thereby invalidated. Id. at 59-60, 333 
A.2d at 600. 
28. See Sitnick, 254 Md. at 323, 255 A.2d at 385 (citing Moser, supra note 1, at 351 
n.80). 
29. Id. at 316-17,255 A.2d at 382. 
30. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3 (1981). 
31. III Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909). 
32. Rossberg v. State, III Md. at 416-17, 74 A. at 584. 
33. E.g., Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 396 A.2d 1080 (1979); 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303,255 A.2d 376 (1969); Reed v. President 
of North East, 226 Md. 229, 172 A.2d 536 (1961); Murray v. Director of Planning, 
217 Md. 381, 143 A.2d 85 (1958); Heubeck v. Mayor of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 
107 A.2d 99 (1954). The court in Sitnick expressed the rule as follows: "[AJ polit-
ical subdivision may not prohibit what the State by general public law has permit-
ted, but it may prohibit what the State has not expressly permitted." 254 Md. at 
317,255 A.2d at 382 (emphasis added). 
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When a public local law and a local law both pertain to the same 
subject matter, as a general rule, conflicts between the two are resolved in 
favor of the locallaw. 34 The Maryland Constitution provides that a pub-
lic local law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the charter of a 
political subdivision is repealed thereby.35 This means that when a 
county's charter, which is the local equivalent of a state's constitution, 
contains a provision that conflicts with a prior public local law, the pub-
lic local law is void. With respect to conflicts between local laws, which 
are enacted pursuant to such a charter, and public local laws, the Mary-
land Constitution provides that a charter county shall have the power to 
repeal a public local law concerning a matter covered by the express 
powers granted to charter counties.36 Although there is no mention of 
"conflict" or "inconsistency" in this constitutional provision, courts have 
interpreted the provision to mean that a public local law that conflicts 
with a local law is void.37 
The language of article XI-A, section 4 proscribes public local laws 
concerning a subject matter over which the General Assembly expressly 
has granted local control to counties.38 This constitutional provision es-
sentially grants charter counties "preemptive" power in the sense that 
the state legislature may not enact a law that is applicable only to a par-
ticular charter county on a matter covered by the Express Powers Act, 
regardless of whether that county has enacted a local law on that matter. 
The purpose of this provision is to prevent the state legislature from gov-
erning local affairs in a county that has adopted charter home rule. One 
opinion has noted that the General Assembly cannot "share one of the 
granted fields of local law" with a county that has adopted a charter, but 
can "only change the right to those fields or parts of them" by amending 
provisions of the Express Powers Act. 39 
C. Summary 
The foregoing material explains the general principles governing 
conflict and preemption between state and local legislation. The general 
principles governing conflict and preemption between federal and state 
(or local) legislation - as well as principles governing an additional 
often-present component of the federal-state tier: Commerce Clause 
34. See 4 C. ANTIEAU, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW §§ 31.05,31.09 (1986). 
35. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 1 (1981). The term "repealed" as used in this section does 
not signify a local legislative body's nullification of one of its own enactments, but 
rather signifies that legislative body's nullification of a public local law enacted by 
the state legislature. 
36. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3 (1981). 
37. See James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 137, 148-49, 377 A.2d 865, 871 (1977) (citing 
article XI-A, section 3 of the Maryland Constitution and construing it to mean that 
the county's subsequent enactment oflocallegislation "clearly repeal[ed] by implica-
tion any inconsistent provisions" of prior public local law relating to same subject 
matter. [d. (emphasis added». 
38. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 4 (1981). 
39. Ness v. Supervisors of Elections, 162 Md. 529, 535, 160 A. 8, 10 (1932). 
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analysis - are not discussed in this article. The following material ana-
lyzes the principles governing state-local and federal-state preemption 
and conflict in the contexts of solid nonhazardous waste regulation and 
hazardous waste regulation, respectively. 
III. REGULATION OF NONHAZARDOUS SOLID WASTE 
IN MARYLAND 
A. Local Authority 
Solid waste regulation, in the absence of state preemption, tradition-
ally is regarded as the responsibility of local government and typically is 
accomplished through zoning ordinances.40 Various county codes also 
regulate solid waste management through the authority vested in the 
county government to regulate environmental health.41 Courts have lim-
ited the local control of solid waste by refusing to allow local govern-
ments to prevent absolutely the disposal of solid waste within the county 
or municipality, absent a clear showing that a landfill would present a 
public nuisance or has failed to comply with established regulations.42 
Another limitation is the judicial invalidation of local ordinances that 
prohibit the transportation of refuse from outside of the state into the 
county.43 
40. Comment, An Assessment of the Role of Local Government in Environmental Regu-
lation, 5 l:JCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 145, 158 (1986) [hereinafter "Environmental 
Regulation"]' For example, under Anne Arundel County zoning regulations, sani-
tary landfills are permitted, subject to certain provisions, in RA-Agricultural Resi-
dential Districts, DD-Deferred Development Districts and W3-Industrial Districts, 
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 13-343.29 (1982); Caro-
line County zoning regulations only set forth setback and screening restrictions for, 
and prohibit refuse burning at, sanitary landfills, CAROLINE COUNTY, MD., ZON-
ING ORDINANCE §§ 6-9 (1982); Cecil County permits sanitary landfills as special 
exceptions to agricultural and open space zones, subject to certain restrictions, 
CECIL COUNTY, MD., ZoNING ORDINANCE § 6.03 (1984), and provides special re-
strictions applicable to sites used for sludge disposal and handling, see id. § 6.10; 
Talbot County zoning ordinances require application for a permit and conformance 
with certain provisions before development of any site as a solid waste disposal site, 
TALBOT COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 8.06 (1981); and Worcester County 
subjects solid waste disposal site development to certain zoning provisions, 
WORCESTER COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 1-316 (1978). 
41. See supra notes 6-11, 15 and accompanying text. See, e.g., ANNE ARUNDEL 
COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 14, § 2-103 (1987) (requiring approval of refuse disposal 
sites by County Health Officer); id. §§ 4-101 to 4-116 (governing landfills); id. §§ 5-
10 1 to 5-102 (prohibiting storage and limiting transportation of polychlorinated bi-
phenyl); BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 13-49 to 13-53 (1978 & Supp. 1984) 
(governing incinerator disposal and sanitary landfill sites); FREDERICK COUNTY, 
MD., CODE art. 3, §§ 1-11-27 to 1-11-36 (1979) (governing facilities for, and trans-
portation of, refuse disposal); HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 9-1 to 9-19 (1978) 
(imposing environmental controls on solid waste disposal); HOWARD COUNTY, 
MD., CODE §§ 18.600-18.606 (1977) (regulating sanitary landfills); MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 48-1 to 48-44 (Supp. 1982) (governing solid waste collec-
tion, transportation, and disposal). 
42. Environmental Regulation, supra note 40, at 158-59 (cited cases omitted). 
43. See, e.g., Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md. 
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B. Federal and State Regulation 
Apart from these limitations, the existence of federal and state laws 
which either preempt or conflict with local legislation also limits local 
governmental regulation of solid waste. On the federal level, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") regulates solid waste 
disposal.44 One of the express objectives of the RCRA is "provi[sion] for 
the promulgation of guidelines for solid waste collection, transport, sepa-
ration, recovery, and disposal practices and systems."45 The RCRA ex-
presses an intent that "the collection and disposal of solid wastes should 
continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agen-
cies."46 Further, the RCRA provides for federal technical and financial 
assistance to such agencies to facilitate their development of comprehen-
sive plans.47 Such assistance is conditioned, however, upon the compli-
ance of these state, regional, and local agencies with federal guidelines.48 
On the state level, Maryland's regulation of solid waste is codified in 
1983) (provision of county code prohibiting transportation of refuse from outside 
state to a landfill within county absent authorization declared unconstitutional as 
violative of Commerce Clause); cf ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 28, 
§ 12-242(a)(6) (1987) ("Only waste generated within the boundaries of the County 
is accepted as fill material"); HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 9-15 (1986) (dump-
ing or deposit of waste generated outside of county prohibited within county); 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 48-22 (Supp. 1982) (requiring permit to 
haul refuse from outside of state into county). But cf County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 
299 Md. 203,473 A.2d 12 (1984) (county regulation prohibiting disposal of refuse 
collected from without county limits in publicly owned landfills upheld as not viola-
tive of Commerce Clause). 
44. 42 V.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
45. 42 V.S.C.A. § 6902(a)(8) (West SUpp. 1988). The term "solid waste" is defined as: 
[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply 
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded mate-
rial, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material re-
sulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, 
and from community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved 
material in domestic sewage, or . . . in irrigation return flows. . . . 
42 V.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982). 
46. [d. § 6901(a)(4). Furthermore, the Environmental Protection Agency has an-
nounced a policy of increasing the delegation of responsibility to the states for ad-
ministering federal environmental laws through issuance of permits, conducting of 
inspections, and enforcement of the federal provisions. See Freilich, Acconcia, 
Martin, Judicial Federalism and State Sovereignty: Trends and Developments in Ur-
ban, State and Local Government Law, 16 VRB. LAW. 539, 607 (1984). 
47. 42 V.S.C. §§ 6902(a)(I), 6941, 6947-49 (1982 & West SUpp. 1988). 
48. 42 V.S.C.A. § 6941 (West Supp. 1988) (federal assistance is intended only for com-
prehensive planning conducted "pursuant to Federal guidelines"); see 42 V.S.C. 
§ 6942 (1982 & West Supp. 1988) (directing Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency to promulgate solid waste management guidelines to the states); 
id. § 6943 (providing minimum requirements to be met by state plans for approval 
by such Administrator); id. § 6944 (directing such Administrator to promulgate cri-
teria for distinguishing sanitary landfills from open dumps, and requiring state plans 
to prohibit establishment of the latter); id. § 6945 (requiring state plans to mandate 
that existing disposal facilities that are open dumps be upgraded to status of sanitary 
landfills). 
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both the Natural Resources and the Environment49 articles of the Mary-
land Annotated Code. The Maryland Environmental Service ("MES") 
was established under the Natural Resources article in part to provide 
waste purification and disposal services in compliance with state legisla-
tion50 and in consultation with, or under the direction of, the Secretary of 
the Environment. 51 The MES operates in cooperation with another state 
instrumentality, the Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority (the 
"Authority").52 The Authority serves as a regional coordinating agency 
charged with assisting participating political subdivisions and other pub-
lic as well as private entities to provide adequate waste disposal facili-
ties. 53 Subject to certain restrictions,54 any charter county not a 
participant in the Authority may, by resolution or ordinance, enter into 
contracts with any industrial concern for the management of solid 
waste. 55 
Similar to the federal RCRA, the Environment article of the Mary-
land Annotated Code expressly provides for the adoption of a plan by 
each county for developing and maintaining solid waste disposal systems, 
acceptance facilities, and collection and disposal programs. 56 The article 
49. The Environment article supersedes the former Health-Environmental article. See 
1987 Md. Laws 306 (creating a new executive department known as the Department 
of the Environment to be responsible, inter alia, for certain programs involving solid 
waste management). 
50. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-102(a) (1983). Among the responsibilities with 
which the MES is charged are research and development in the area of solid waste 
disposal and management, id. § 3-105(c), and preparation of a five-year plan for 
each service region for effective provision of solid waste disposal projects. Id. § 3-
106(d). A "service region" is defined as a geographic area designated by the MES 
and within which the MES director, "after consultation with the municipalities af-
fected, causes surveys, plans, studies, and estimates to be made for the purpose of 
determining the most dependable, effective, and efficient means of providing services 
through ... solid waste disposal projects .... " MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-
101(1) (Supp. 1987). The MES is authorized to "adopt lawful regulations it deems 
necessary for the public's health and safety, comfort, and convenience" in the man-
agement of its solid waste disposal projects. Id. § 3-129(a). 
51. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 3-105(d), (e), 3-106(a), 3-110, 3-111 (1983) 
(as amended by 1987 Md. Laws 306). Formerly, these sections provided for consul-
tation with, and direction by, the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene. 
52. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-902 (1983). 
53. Id. Among the powers granted to the Authority is the power to make rules and 
regulations that may "exclude or require preconditioning of any waste that might 
otherwise ... endanger the health or safety of workers or others." Id. § 3-905(r). 
54. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-9A-01 (Supp. 1987). For example, subsection 
(b)(1) requires such contracts to be in connection only with solid waste disposal 
facilities that are financed under the Natural Resources article and that are located 
either within the charter county or in another participating county. Id. § 3-9A-
01(b)(1). See id. §§ 3-113 to -128, 3-906 to -917 (1983 & Supp. 1987) (provisions 
governing financing of solid waste management). Subsection (b)(2) proscribes con-
tracts in connection with a landfill. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-9A-01(b)(2) 
(Supp. 1987). 
55. Id. § 3-9A-Ol (Supp. 1987). 
56. See MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-503(a) (1987). "Solid waste" is defined as "any 
garbage, refuse, sludge, or liquid from industrial, commercial, mining, or agricul-
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also empowers groups of two or more counties to create sanitary dis-
tricts,57 to be governed by a sanitary commission. 58 One court has ob-
served that the Maryland provisions appear to allow counties maximum 
flexibility to implement solid waste management plans,59 a characteristic 
similar to the RCRA's expression of intent not to preempt state solid 
waste plans. 
Despite this apparent flexibility on the local level, the Environment 
article is analogous to the RCRA in yet another sense. Certain provisions 
of the Environment article call for state assistance to counties and munic-
ipalities in the development and regional coordination of comprehensive 
master plans for the construction of industrial waste disposal facilities. 60 
Furthermore, just as state plans are subject under the RCRA to federal 
regulations, county plans are subject to state rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Department of the Environment.61 Finally, before 
any entity, including the state, counties, and municipalities, can install, 
alter, or extend a refuse disposal system, the Secretary of the Environ-
ment62 must issue a permit authorizing the same.63 These provisions in-
dicate that although the fundamental implementation of solid waste 
. management plans remains a local concern, the broad policy guidelines 
adopted by state environmental legislation dictate the substance of those 
plans. 
A recent Maryland decision, however, has rejected the proposition 
that the state regulatory scheme preempts the field of nonhazardous solid 
waste regulation either expressly or by occupation. In Ad + Soil, Inc. v. 
County Commissioners of Queen Anne's CountY,64 the operator of a sew-
age sludge storage and distribution facility obtained the necessary permit 
from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to operate such a 
facility in Queen Anne's County, as required by section 9-21O(b) of the 
tural operations or from community activities" and excludes "solid or dissolved ma-
terial in domestic sewage or in irrigation return flows." [d. § 9-1010). A "county 
plan" is defined as "a comprehensive plan adequately providing throughout the 
county, including all towns, municipal corporations, and sanitary districts in the 
county, the following facilities and services by public or private ownership: ... (iii) 
solid waste disposal systems; (iv) solid waste acceptance facilities; and (v) systematic 
collection and disposal of solid waste, including litter." [d. § 9-501(d)(I). No solid 
waste disposal system or solid waste acceptance facility may be installed or extended 
unless it conforms to such a county plan. [d. § 9-511(3), (4). 
57. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-611 (1987). 
58. [d. § 9-621 (1987). 
59. See King v. Gleason, 32 Md. App. 145, 154, 359 A.2d 242, 246 (1976). 
60. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-207(b) (1987). This state assistance consists partly ofa 
Sanitary Facilities Fund, created to finance planning and construction of facilities. 
[d. § 9-218. 
61. [d. § 9-51O(b)(4), (5), (7) (1987); see 1987 Md. Laws 306 (redefining "Department" 
in section l-101(c) from Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to Department 
of Environment). 
62. See 1987 Md. Laws 306 (redefining Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene to 
Secretary of the Environment in section 1-101(h». 
63. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-204 (1987). 
64. 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986). 
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former Health-Environmental article of the Maryland Annotated 
Code.65 The operator failed, however, to secure zoning approval from 
county authorities as required by a county zoning ordinance.66 When 
ordered by county authorities to cease operations, the operator chal-
lenged the ordinance on preemption grounds.67 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the state permit re-
quirement did not preempt the county permit requirement.68 The court 
reasoned that although the General Assembly had enacted extensive 
statewide legislation in the field of sewage management, several statutory 
provisions of the Health-Environmental article granting local govern-
mental authority manifested collectively an intent "not to prohibit local 
legislation, but rather to coordinate and supplement such legislation 
through the enactment of a statewide regulatory panoply."69 The court 
noted further that the state's regulation of sewage sludge utilization was 
not "so comprehensive that 'the acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emp-
tion by occupation [was] compelled.' "70 
Certain procedural and substantive exceptions to the general provi-
sions regarding county plans exist for Baltimore, Carroll, Harford, 
Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties.71 The exceptions relating 
to Baltimore, Carroll, Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties come 
dangerously close to constituting public local laws,72 and the exception 
relating to Harford County is clearly a public local law.73 Because 
Harford County has power pursuant to section 5(X) of the Express Pow-
ers Act74 to adopt a county plan, conceivably the General Assembly en-
acted the exceptions applicable uniquely to Harford County in violation 
of article XI-A, section 4 of the Maryland Constitution.75 
One provision that appears to reserve significant power to local gov-
ernments is section 9-210 of the Environment article, which addresses 
one of the procedural prerequisites for the issuance of a permit by the 
Secretary of the Environment to install, maintain, alter, or extend a re-
65. Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners, 307 Md. at 310-11, 513 A.2d at 895. 
66. Id. at 314, 513 A.2d at 896. 
67. Id. at 314, 513 A.2d at 896-97. 
68. Id. at 334, 513 A.2d at 907. 
69. Id. at 328, 513 A.2d at 904. 
70. Id. at 333, 513 A.2d at 906. 
71. See MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. §§ 9-513 to -515 (1987). 
72. Because section 9-513 of the Environment article pertains to both Baltimore County 
and Carroll County, and because section 9-515 of that article pertains to both Mont-
gomery County and Prince George's County, neither of these two sections falls 
within the strict definition of "public local law," i.e., a state law applicable to only 
one county. See supra note 20. 
73. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-514 (1987). 
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(X) (1987). Section 9-505 of the Environment article 
cites article 25A, section 5(X) as the source of a charter county's power to adopt a 
county plan for the provision of solid waste disposal systems and acceptance facili-
ties. See MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-505(a)(I)(iii) (1987). 
75. See supra notes 21, 38-39, and accompanying text. 
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fuse disposal system.76 Section 9-210 conditions issuance of such a per-
mit upon compliance with county zoning and land use regulations and 
upon approval by county governing bodies. Whether a proposed state 
facility is subject to these conditions has never been judicially deter-
mined.77 Nevertheless, the inclusion of the state among those entities 
subject to the permit requirement itselP8 means that the state is likewise 
subject to the procedural prerequisites set forth in section 9-210. 
Finally, with regard to conflicts between state and county legisla-
tion, section 9-502(c) of the Environment article provides that any rule 
or regulation adopted under the "County Water and Sewerage Plans" 
subtitle,79 "does not limit or supersede any other county, municipal, or 
State law, rule or regulation that provides greater protection to the public 
health, safety, or welfare."80 By negative implication, the statutory pro-
visions of this subtitle themselves limit or supersede more protective state 
or local legislation. 
The field of nonhazardous solid waste management in Maryland re-
mains decidedly statewide and local in character with minimal federal 
oversight. This is evidenced by the relative pervasiveness of state pro-
grams. The field of hazardous waste management, by contrast, is primar-
ily within the federal domain, which fairly dictates the tenor of equally 
76. Section 9-210 (1987) provides: 
The Secretary may not issue a permit to install, materially alter, or materi-
ally extend a landfill until: 
(1) The landfill meets all zoning and land use requirements of the 
county where the landfill is or is to be located; and 
(2) The Department has a written statement that the board of 
county commissioners of the county council of the county where the land-
fill is to be located does not oppose the issuance of the permit. 
MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-210 (1987). The term "landfill" refers to a "landfill 
refuse disposal system." See id § 9-21O(d)(3)-(4). For discussion of the definition of 
this latter term within the meaning of the permit requirement, see Hart & Miller 
Islands Area Envtl. Group v. Corps of Engineers, 505 F. Supp. 732, 738-40 (D. Md. 
1980). 
77. In Hart & Miller Islands Area Envtl. Group, section 9-210 (formerly HEALTH-
ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-212(a)(4), which was derived from former MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 43, § 394A) was held inapplicable because the proposed state facility did 
not constitute a "landfill refuse disposal system." 505 F. Supp. at 738-40 (not ad-
dressing the fact that the proposed facility would be state-operated). 
78. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-204(d) (1987) (permit requirement). Section 9-204(d) 
provides, "A person shall have a permit issued by the Secretary under this section 
before the person installs, materially alters, or materially extends a ... refuse dispo-
sal system" (emphasis added). The term "person" includes the federal government, 
a state, county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision. Id. § 9-201(c). 
79. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. §§ 9-501 to -521 (1987). 
80. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-502(c) (1987). Section 9-502(c) differs substantively 
from section 9-515 of the superseded Health-Environmental article, which provided 
that local or state legislation would not be limited or superseded only "to the extent 
of its or their greater protection .... " MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-515 
(1982). Conceivably, difficulties with practical application of the former language 
explain its absence from section 9-502(c) of the Environment article. 
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comprehensive state regulation and which leaves little room for local 
control. 
IV. REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE IN MARYLAND 
Traditionally, most hazardous waste has been disposed of "on-site," 
that is, on land owned or leased by the generator.8l The advent ofperva-
sive regulation, however, has prompted a demand for environmentally 
safe off-site treatment and disposal facilities, which, in turn, has 
prompted local opposition to the siting of facilities. 82 In Maryland, at-
tempts to prohibit by county ordinance the disposal in and transporta-
tion through a county of various hazardous wastes not originating in that 
county have been declared violative of the Commerce Clause. 83 
A. Local Authority 
Local legislation in Maryland virtually has been eclipsed by compre-
hensive federal and state regulatory schemes. County regulation typi-
cally consists of either general requirements of consultation and 
approval84 or limited zoning restrictions concerning the location and 
area of hazardous waste disposal facilities, such as required distances 
from residences and from areas prone to moisture or seepage.85 
81. Special Report, Siting of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities: A Major Prob-
lem Facing Industry and States, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 872 (November 13, 
1981) (estimating that approximately 75% to 90% of hazardous waste is disposed of 
on-site). 
82. Id. at 871. This resistance has been dubbed the "not in my backyard" syndrome. 
Id. See generally Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of 
Hazardous-Waste Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 1 (1981). 
83. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 138-39, 142-43, 
438 A.2d 269,270,271-72 (1981). Ordinances that prohibit any and all hazardous 
waste disposal in sanitary landfills are more likely to withstand Commerce Clause 
scrutiny, because they do not discriminatorily exclude only out-of-state hazardous 
waste disposal. See ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 28, § 12-242(a)(9) 
(1982) ("The [sanitary landfill] operation shall not accept hazardous waste ... as 
fill."); see also CECIL COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 6.1l(C) (1984) ("It is 
the policy of Cecil County that there shall be no hazardous waste placed in landfills 
under any circumstances. "). 
84. See, e.g., BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE § 13-48 (1978) ("The disposal of haz-
ardous and special wastes shall be resolved by consultation with, and subject to 
approval [by], the county health officer."); HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 109-
8(F) ("The collection and disposal of hazardous and special waste shall be the re-
sponsibility of the [County] Director of Public Works, except that disposal sites and 
procedures shall be subject to the approval of the County Health Officer or his des-
ignated representative.") (1986); id. §§ 146-1 to 146-5 (requiring transporters of 
hazardous waste, specifically high-level nuclear waste, to notify county officials of 
transportation of such waste into county). 
85. See, e.g., CECIL COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 6. 11 (A)-(B) (1984) (prohib-
iting hazardous waste re-cycling and incineration facilities within prescribed dis-
tances from adjoining property lines and loo-year flood plains). But see id. 
§ 6.11(C) (prohibiting deposit of hazardous waste in landfills); FREDERICK 
COUNTY, MD., CODE § 1-11-32 (1979) (prohibiting deposit of hazardous wastes in 
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B. State Regulation 
On the state level, hazardous waste86 is managed in part under the 
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Program (the "Program"), which is ad-
ministered by a Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Board (the 
"Board").87 The purpose of the Program is to "protect the public health 
and the environment by ensuring the availability of sites and properly 
designed facilities to dispose of, reuse, recycle, incinerate, or otherwise 
render nonhazardous, hazardous waste materials and to eliminate illegal 
dumping or improper disposal."88 The Board is empowered to adopt 
rules and regulations to implement the Program89 and to issue "certifi-
cates of public necessity" for the siting of hazardous and low level nu-
clear waste facilities.90 
Two provisions of the section governing certificates of public neces-
sity indicate that the section is intended to preempt parallel or conflicting 
local requirements. First, section 3-705( d)( 1) provides that the issuance 
of such a certificate exempts the site, the facility on the site, and the 
transportation of hazardous waste to and from the facility from local 
zoning and other ordinances and local regulations, laws, and policies, as 
well as from state laws requiring that approval be obtained from political 
subdivisions.91 Second, under section 3-705(e), the issuance of such a 
certificate is not itself subject to municipal or county approval.92 
refuse disposal facilities); id. § 1-11-38 (imposing civil penalty and mandatory in-
junction to remove hazardous material from refuse disposal facility site). 
86. "Hazardous waste" is defined as "any waste substance or material designated as a 
hazardous substance pursuant to § 7-208 [sic] of the Environment article." MD. 
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-701(e) (Supp. 1987). "Hazardous substance" is defined 
as "any substance that: (i) [c]onveys toxic, lethal, or other injurious effects or which 
causes sub-lethal alterations to plant, animal, or aquatic life; (ii) [m]ay be injurious 
to human beings; or (iii) [p]ersists in the environment." The term includes "any 
matter identified as a 'hazardous waste' by the Environmental Protection Agency." 
MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 7-201(m) (1987). The Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") establishes criteria for characterizing a substance as hazardous waste. See 
40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2) (1987) (general); id. § 261.21 (ignitability); id. § 261.22 
(corrosivity); id. § 261.23 (reactivity); id. § 261.24 (toxicity). The EPA also pro-
vides lists of hazardous waste substances. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.31-261.33 (1987). 
87. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 3-701 to -713 (1983 & Supp. 1987). 
88. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-702(a)(I) (1983). The same goals are intended to 
be achieved with respect to low-level nuclear waste. Id. Low-level nuclear waste is 
treated separately by the Board. See id. § 3-702(a)(2). 
89. Id. § 3-704 (1983). 
90. Id. § 3-705(a)(1) (1983\ & Supp. 1987). Facilities used for receipt, transfer, recovery, 
or disposal of nonhazardous or nonradioactive residential, commercial, or industrial 
waste are exempted from the requirement of obtaining a certificate. Id. § 3-
705(a)(2)-(3). 
91. Id. § 3-705(d)(I) (1983 & Supp. 1987). 
92. With respect to both of these subsections, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
construed section 3-705, implicitly referring to subsections (d)(I) and (e), as having 
"expressly preempt[ ed] local legislation on the subject of hazardous waste transpor-
tation and disposal if the operator of a disposal site obtains a State-issued Certificate 
of Public Necessity." Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 
153,438 A.2d 269, 277 (1981). 
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Section 3-705(e) also requires that any local plan for management of 
liquid, solid, hazardous, or low-level nuclear waste be consistent with the 
terms of such certificate. The inclusion of nonhazardous solid waste 
management in this requirement seems incongruous with the essential 
purpose of the Program, because the Program is designed to ensure 
through proper facility siting that hazardous wastes will not endanger 
the public health.93 Solid waste management is subject to an independent 
regulatory scheme, the goals of which are not necessarily parallel in all 
respects to the goals of a hazardous waste program. To require a local 
solid waste management plan to be consistent with the terms of a certifi-
cate of public necessity for a hazardous waste facility is to engraft unrea-
sonable additional requirements onto such a plan. 
In contrast to the preemptive language of section 3-705, section 3-
710 calls for the preparation of initial and updated inventories of, and 
programs for using, hazardous waste facility sites throughout the state by 
the MES "[i]n consultation with the appropriate agencies of . . . local 
government"94 and "[i]n consultation with appropriate ... local officials 
and governing bodies."95 These requirements suggest that local govern-
ment may have a hand in state control of hazardous waste facility siting. 
Siting of hazardous waste facilities is subject to the permit require-
ment set forth in section 9-204 of the Environment article of the Mary-
land Annotated Code.96 Section 9-226 of the Environment article 
provides that the Secretary of the Environment may not issue a permit 
for any landfill system of refuse disposal for hazardous wastes if the land-
fill system does not qualify for a certificate of public necessity under sec-
tion 3-705(d)(2) of the Natural Resources article.97 Section 3-705(d)(2) 
precludes the Board from issuing a certificate of public necessity for the 
purpose of "extending or expanding" any hazardous waste landfill "in 
operation" before July 1, 1980 that was permitted under title 7, subtitle 2 
of the Environment article98 and under section 9-204 of that article.99 
The terms "extending" and "expanding" as used in section 3-705(d)(2) 
are defined in section 3-705(d)(3) to include lateral development and ma-
terial alteration, respectively, of an existing landfill for the purpose of 
establishing a proposed disposal capacity.l00 Evidently, section 9-226 of 
93. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
94. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-71O(a)(I)(i) (Supp. 1987); see also id. § 3-
71O(a)(2)(i) (inventory and program to be updated "in consultation with the appro-
priate ... local agencies and local governing bodies'~). 
95. Id. § 3-71O(a)(I)(i) 3. The MES must also solicit and consider recommendations 
from the governing body of each subdivison in preparing the inventory and inven-
tory updates. Id. § 3-71O(a)(1)(ii), (a)(2)(ii). The term "subdivision" includes "the 
23 counties or Baltimore City and incorporated municipalities." Id. § 3-701 (i) 
(1983). 
96. See supra notes 63, 78 and accompanying text. 
97. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-226 (1987). 
98. See infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text. 
99. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705(d)(2) (1983 & Supp. 1987). 
100. Id. § 3-705(d)(3) (1983). 
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the Environment article applies only to the expansion or extension of 
existing landfill systems. to! Implicitly, no permit may be issued for in-
stallation of a new landfill system of refuse disposal for hazardous wastes. 
Hazardous waste management on the state level is also exercised in 
part pursuant to title 7, subtitle 2 of the Environment article. to2 The 
Department of the Environment is empowered under this subtitle to is-
sue permits to install, modify, or operate disposal systemsto3 and permits 
that require construction, modification, extension, or alteration of new or 
existing disposal systems or treatment works.!04 A facility permit is re-
quired for the ownership, establishment, operation, or maintenance of a' 
controlled hazardous substance facility in the state. to5 
The Attorney General of Maryland may assess both civil106 and 
criminal to7 penalties for violations of the provisions of, and any regula-
tions adopted under, title 7, subtitle 2.to8 Further, the Department of the 
Environment may obtain injunctive relief against continued violations 
without the usual prerequisite showing of an inadequate remedy at 
law.!09 In addition to any other remedies available at law or in equity, 
the Department may impose, by administrative action, a monetary pen-
alty for any violation of a provision or regulation.! to A showing of actual 
harm to the environment is not required for assessment of any of the 
10 l. Section 9-226 of the Environment article is derived from former section 9-21O(f) of 
the superseded Health-Environmental article. These two sections are substantively 
identical, except that former section 9-21O(f) of the Health-Environmental article 
expressly applied to "proposed" landfill systems. Because section 3-70S(d)(2) of the 
Natural Resources article provides for certificates of public necessity only for exten-
sion or expansion of existing facilities, a "proposed" landfill system could not possi-
bly qualify for such a certificate. For this reason, the term "proposed" was deleted 
when section 9·226 of the Environment article was adopted. See MD. ENV'T CODE 
ANN. § 9-226 (1987) (Revisor's Note) (emphasis added). 
102. MD. ENv'T CODE ANN. §§ 7-201 to 7-268 (1987) (entitled "Controlled Hazardous 
Substances"). The purpose of this subtitle is to provide additional remedies to pre-
vent, abate, and control pollution of the waters of the state. Id. § 7-203. 
103. Id. § 7-207(a)(S) (1987). 
104. Id. § 7-207(a)(2) (1987). The Department is further authorized to adopt rules and 
regulations to execute the provisions of this subtitle. Id. § 7-208(a). The Depart-
ment is responsible for inspecting controlled hazardous substance facilities. Id. § 7-
24S(a). The Department is also required to publish and update a master list of 
existing sites at which hazardous substances may be present, as well as proposed 
sites at which the Department intends to conduct preliminary site assessments. Id. 
§ 7-223(a)-(c). 
lOS. Id. § 7-232(a) (1987). A "controlled hazardous substance facility" is defined as "a 
disposal structure, system, or geographic area, designated by the Department for 
treatment, storage related to treatment or disposal, or disposal of controlled hazard-
ous substances." Id. § 7-201(c). Disposal of hazardous substances in any manner 
other than according to the provisions of this subtitle and in a facility possessing a 
permit is prohibited. Id. § 7-224(a). . 
106. Id. § 7-266(a) (1987). 
107. Id. §§ 7-26S, 7-267. 
108. Id. § 7-268. 
109. Id. § 7-263(a),(c). 
110. Id. § 7-266(b). 
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foregoing penalties. I I I 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of title 7, subtitle 2, is its estab-
lishment of a State Hazardous Substance Control Fund or 
"Superfund."1l2 The Superfund is used partly to finance removal, resto-
ration, or remedial action by state agents in response to a release or a 
threatened release of controlled hazardous substances into the environ-
ment. 113 All expenditures from the Superfund for environmental cleanup 
and for other responses or remedial action resulting from this release or 
threatened release are to be reimbursed by the "responsible person."114 
If necessary, the Attorney General will bring suit to recover costs against 
any responsible person who fails to make reimbursement. lls 
A noteworthy aspect of this subtitle is its regulation of hazardous 
substance transportation. Hazardous and low-level nuclear wastes may 
be transported either from any source in the state or to any facility in the 
state only if the person so transporting holds a "hauler certificate," the 
transporting vehicle has been issued a "vehicle certificate," and the driver 
of such vehicle has been issued a "driver certificate."1l6 Persons who 
generate and desire to transport hazardous substances to a facility must 
comply with a host of additional requirements. 117 These requirements do 
not serve to prevent hazardous substances generated elsewhere from en-
tering the state; such barriers against out-of-state hazardous substances 
are prohibited under the Commerce Clause. ll8 Nevertheless, these re-
Ill. See American Recovery Co. v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 306 Md. 
12, 506 A.2d 117l (1986). Although only civil penalties were at issue in American 
Recovery Co., similar language in the criminal provision renders the court's reason-
ing applicable to that provision as well. 
112. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 7-218 (1987). 
1l3. [d. § 7-220(b)(I). The procedures and standards for responding to releases of haz-
ardous substances are set forth in the Hazardous Substance Response Plan ("the 
Response Plan") published by the Department of the Environment. See id. §§ 7-
223(d)(I), 7-223(e). The Secretary of the Environment is authorized to act accord-
ing to the Response Plan to arrange for the removal of hazardous substances upon 
their release or threat of release, unless the Secretary determines that the owner or 
operator of the facility from which the release or threat of release emanates, or any 
other responsible party, will undertake proper and timely removal and remedial 
action. [d. § 7-222(a)(I). 
114. [d. § 7-221(a). A "responsible person" evidently includes "[t]he owner or operator 
of the facility [from which the release or threatened release emanated] ... or ... any 
other responsible party." [d. § 7-222(a). Furthermore, the use of the term "or" in 
the phrase "owner or operator" suggests that the owner and the operator of the 
facility need not be the same person and that both owners and operators may be 
liable for reimbursement. 
115. [d. § 7-221(b)(I) (1987). 
116. [d. § 7-249(a). Special requirements for haulers of low-level nuclear waste are con-
tained in section 7-250. 
117. See id. § 7-253 (1987). For example, such persons must provide a manifest for each 
vehicle describing its cargo, possess evidence of all three types of certificates, label 
the substance transported, and report certain information periodically to the De-
partment. [d. 
118. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey statute 
prohibiting importation of out-of-state solid or liquid waste held violative of Com-
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quirements could be characterized collectively as a burden imposed on 
interstate commerce. Such a burden, if "clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits," is subject to invalidation under the Com-
merce Clause. 119 Aside from limitations imposed by the Commerce 
Clause, a second limitation on the state's power to regulate hazardous 
waste transportation is the presence of extensive parallel regulation on 
the federal level. 
C. Federal Regulation 
1. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 
Under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act ("HMTA"),120 
the Department of Transportation ("DOT") is authorized to promulgate 
regulations concerning the transportation of121 and, in particular, the 
handling of122 hazardous materials. 123 Pursuant to this enabling legisla-
tion, the DOT has issued comprehensive regulations governing interstate 
transportation of hazardous wastes. 124 
Any state or local requirement that is inconsistent with either the 
statutory requirements of the HMT A or the DOT regulations adopted 
thereunder is, with one important exception, expressly preempted. 125 
The exception provides that upon application by an appropriate state 
agency, the Secretary of Transportation shall determine whether incon-
sistent state or local requirements (1) afford an equal or greater level of 
protection to the public than is afforded under the HMTA and (2) do not 
burden commerce unreasonably. 126 If the Secretary determines that both 
criteria are satisfied, then the HMT A does not preempt the inconsistent 
state or local requirement. 
Under this codified preemption analysis procedure, if the Secretary's 
preliminary inquiry reveals that the state or local requirement is consis-
tent with the federal scheme, then such requirement is not preempted, 
merce Clause proscription of protectionist measures that impede interstate 
commerce). 
119. 437 U.S. at 624; see Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 
143-44, 150,438 A.2d 269,272,276 (1981) (ordinance requiring that all persons 
intending to transport hazardous wastes through county have on file with county an 
application and license issued by such county and a manifest detailing nature and 
quantity of each shipment, that such manifest accompany all hazardous waste ship-
ments through county, and that each vehicle be registered annually and regularly 
inspected struck down as imposing undue burden on interstate commerce). 
120. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976 & West Supp. 1988). 
121. [d. §§ 1804, 1806 (1976). 
122. [d. § 1805. 
123. A "hazardous material" is defined as "a substance or material in a quantity and 
form which may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety or property when 
transported in commerce." [d. § 1802(2). 
124. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.1-.3, 171.15-.16, 172.200-.205, 172.300-.338, 172.400-
.407, 172.500-.519, 173.1-.34, 173.325-.1300, 177.800-.870 (1987). 
125. 49 U.S.c. § 1811(a) (1976). 
126. [d. § 1811(b). 
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i.e., preemption analysis proceeds no further. This result is significant in 
two respects. First, it means that there is no implied preemption by oc-
cupation of the field of hazardous waste transportation. Thus, a court 
examining a state or local law that has been challenged on preemption 
grounds should find that Congress did not intend to preempt the field of 
hazardous waste transportation. 
Second, this result means that the Secretary does not examine 
whether a consistent state or local requirement imposes an unreasonable 
burden on commerce. Only when such requirement is inconsistent with 
the federal scheme does the Secretary's examination of the burden im-
posed on commerce become part of his preemption analysis. A consis-
tent state or local requirement is not necessarily immunized from a 
Commerce Clause challenge, however. Typically, federal preemption 
and an unreasonable burden on commerce are independent grounds for 
invalidating a state or local law. 127 
DOT regulations prescribe two tests by which to determine whether 
a state or local requirement is inconsistent with the federal scheme. 128 
The Secretary must find either: (1) that compliance with both federal and 
state or local statutes is impossible,129 or (2) that the state or local re-
quirement is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
HMTA and regulations adopted thereunder. 130 If either test is met, the 
state or local requirement is deemed to be inconsistent with the federal 
scheme. The difficulty in applying the second test is an absence of evi-
dence concerning the relative importance Congress has attached to par-
ticular Congressional concerns and objectives. 13I 
2. Hazardous Waste Management Under the RCRA 
The RCRA takes an approach to the relationship between federal 
law and state or local law with respect to hazardous waste132 manage-
ment that is comparable to the HMTA's approach. One of the stated 
objectives of the RCRA is the establishment of a federal-state partner-
127. In Browning-Perris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269 
(1981), the local ordinance under review was challenged and invalidated directly on 
Commerce Clause grounds, and the existence of extensive regulation of hazardous 
waste transportation under the HMT A was used only to demonstrate that the ordi-
nance was unnecessary. 292 Md. at 149-50,438 A.2d at 275-76. The court did not 
address the issue of whether the local ordinance was inconsistent with federal provi-
sions. The doctrine of federal preemption is derived from article VI, clause 2 of the 
Constitution, whereas the notion of an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce 
is derived from article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution. 
128. Courts generally apply the same two tests. See Comment, Preemption of Local Laws 
by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 654, 656-58 
(1986) [hereinafter "HMTA Preemption of Local Laws"]. 
129. 49 C.P.R. § 107.209(c)(I) (1987). 
130. 49 C.F.R. § 107.209(c)(2) (1987). 
131. HMTA Preemption of Local Laws, supra note 128, at 657-58. 
132. "Hazardous waste" is defined under the RCRA as: 
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quan-
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ship to execute its purposes. \33 The RCRA directs the Administrator of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (the "Administrator") to promul-
gate guidelines to assist states in the development of their own hazardous 
waste programs. 134 The RCRA also sets forth procedures for the author-
ization of such programs by the Administrator, contingent upon each 
program's equivalency to and consistency with the federal program and 
upon the adequacy of the state program's enforcement of compliance 
with federal requirements. 13S Each state is also charged with undertak-
ing a program to maintain an inventory of sites within the state that have 
been used for hazardous waste storage or disposal.1 36 Finally, states and 
political subdivisions are prohibited from imposing requirements less 
stringent than those of the RCRA, but may impose more stringent re-
quirements. 137 The import of these provisions is that although the fed-
eral program is not intended to preempt the field of hazardous waste 
management by occupation, concurrent state programs are permitted 
primarily for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the federal 
program. 
The federal program under the RCRA consists of enabling provi-
sions for the promulgation by the Administrator of standards applicable 
to generators138 and transporters139 of hazardous waste and to owners 
and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facili-
ties. 14O The Administrator is further responsible for instituting regula-
tions requiring owners and operators of existing facilities and those 
planning to construct new facilities to obtain a permit. 141 The Adminis-
trator is to promulgate standards applicable to transporters after consul-
tity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics 
may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or 
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or 
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health 
or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or dis-
posed of, or otherwise managed. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982). 
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6902(a)(7) (West Supp. 1988). Among those purposes to be fulfilled 
are the following: (I) assuring that hazardous waste management practices are con-
ducted so as to protect human health and the environment, id. § 6902(a)(4); (2) 
requiring that hazardous waste be properly managed in the first instance so as to 
reduce the need for future corrective measures, id. § 6902(a)(5); and (3) minimizing 
the generation and land disposal of hazardous waste by encouraging process substi-
tution, materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment, 
id. § 6902(a)(6). 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a) (1982). 
135. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6926(b) (West Supp. 1988). 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 6933(a) (1982). 
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West Supp. 1988). 
138. [d. § 6922. 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6924 (West Supp. 1988). 
141. [d. § 6925(a). 
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tation with the Secretary of Transportation and the states. 142 Such 
standards are to be consistent with the requirements of, and regulations 
under, the HMTA.143 
The RCRA requirements are enforced through several mechanisms. 
First, the Administrator may issue to violators orders either compelling 
compliance with RCRA requirements, assessing civil penalties, or 
both.l44 Alternatively, the Administrator may seek appropriate relief in 
a civil action against a violator, which relief may include a temporary or 
permanent injunction. 14s Second, certain knowing conduct in violation 
of the RCRA may render the violator subject to criminal penalties. 146 
Furthermore, private plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general may 
bring suit seeking injunctive relief or assessment of civil penalties or both, 
but they may not seek purely private remedies. 147 
3. The Toxic Substances Control Act 
In addition to the HMT A and the RCRA, a third vehicle for the 
exercise of federal control over hazardous waste is the Toxic Substances 
Control Act ("TaSCA").148 The provisions of TaSCA apply to those 
who manufacture and process chemical substances and mixtures that 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. 149 
TaSCA authorizes the Administrator to promulgate regulations con-
cerning such substances and mixtures, particularly with regard to their 
disposal. 150 Regulations governing the manner of disposal are expressly 
subordinated to conflicting state or local requirements. 151 
TaSCA preempts parallel state and local legislation, however, in 
two instances. 152 First, federal testing requirements preempt state or lo-
cal testing requirements. 153 Second, a state or local regulation applicable 
to chemical substances or mixtures and designed to prevent injury to 
health or the environment may operate concurrently with federal regula-
tions only if the former is identical to the latter, which are adopted pur-
142. 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a) (1982). 
143. Id. § 6923(b). 
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a)(I) (West Supp. 1988). An order may include suspension or 
revocation of a permit. Id. § 6928(a)(3). Compliance orders are themselves en-
forceable through civil penalties and suspension or revocation of permits. Id. 
§ 6928(c). 
145. Id. § 6928(a)(I). Such injunctive relief is not conditional upon a showing of inade-
quacy of legal remedies and risk of irreparable. injury. Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1983). 
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1988). 
147. Lamphier, 714 F.2d at 337; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & West Supp. 1988) 
(providing a private cause of action to enforce standards and requirements relating 
to solid or hazardous waste management). 
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
149. 15 U.S.c. § 260I(b)(I)-(2) (1982). 
150. See id. §§ 2605(a)(3), 2605(a)(6)(A). 
151. Id. § 2605(a)(6)(B). 
152. Id. § 2617(a)(I). 
153. Id. § 26 I 7(a)(2)(A). 
1987] Hazardous and Nonhazardous Waste 135 
suant to federal law, or if the former prohibits the use of such substances 
or mixtures in the state or political subdivision. 154 An exemption from 
this second instance in which preemption occurs exists for states or polit-
ical subdivisions that promulgate regulations meeting the following crite-
ria: (1) consistency with federal regulations; 1 55 (2) provision of a 
"significantly higher degree" of protection than federal regulations; 156 
and (3) no undue burden on interstate commerce. 1S7 The Administrator 
is authorized to grant funds to a state for the establishment of a state 
program designed to facilitate the implementation of TOSCA policies 
within that state. 1 58 
A significant aspect of TOSCA is the recently enacted amendment 
adding a subchapter that pertains to the control of asbestos hazards in 
school buildings. 159 This subchapter contains language authorizing the 
Administrator to prescribe standards for the transportation and disposal 
of asbestos-containing waste material to protect human health and the 
environment. l60 Alternatively, if the Administrator fails to prescribe 
such standards,161 local educational agencies are directed to provide for 
the transportation and disposal of asbestos-containing waste material in 
accordance with a document printed by the Environmental Protection 
Agency entitled "Asbestos Waste Management Guidance."162 The sub-
chapter expressly negates preemption of state law163 and does not pre-
clude private legal remedies. l64 
4. Superfund Legislation 
Finally, perhaps the most significant federal enactment relevant to 
hazardous waste management is the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").165 CERCLA 
essentially empowers the federal government166 to clean up and other-
154. [d. § 2617(a)(2)(B). This instance in which preemption shall occur does not apply if 
the federal regulation is one imposing a requirement described in section 2605(a)(6) 
(concerning methods of disposal). [d.; see also Potomac Electric Power Co. v. 
Sachs, 639 F. Supp. 856, 860-62 (D. Md. 1986). 
155. 15 U.S.c. § 2617(b)(1) (1982). 
156. 15 U.S.c. § 2617(b)(2)(A) (1982). 
157. [d. § 2617(b)(2)(B). Note that the three criteria established under section 2617(b) 
are cumulative, i.e., all three must be met in order for the exemption to apply; cf 49 
U.S.c. § 1811(a)-(b) (1976) (discussed supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text). 
158. 15 U.S.c. § 2627(a) (1976). 
159. 15 U.S.c. §§ 2641-2654 (Supp. IV 1986) (designated "Subchapter II -Asbestos Haz-
ard Emergency Response"). 
160. [d. § 2643(h). 
161. [d. § 2644(a)(I)(C). 
162. [d. § 2644(f). 
163. [d. § 2649(a), (c). 
164. [d. § 2649(b). 
165. 42 U.S.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
166. Although the federal government is the primary actor under the CERCLA scheme, 
CERCLA calls for the establishment of a "national contingency plan," that is to be 
effectuated by federal, state, and local authorities and by interstate and nongovern-
mental entities. 42 U.S.c. § 9605(a)(4) (1982 & West Supp. 1988). See also MD. 
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wise respond to releases or substantial threats of release into the environ-
ment of pollutants or contaminants that may present imminent and 
substantial dangers to the public health or welfare. 167 Expenditures for 
such response costs are financed by a "Superfund,"168 and such costs are 
recoverable against persons liable under CERCLA.169 No CERCLA 
provision is to be construed as precluding any state from imposing addi-
tional liability or requirements concerning the release of hazardous sub-
stances within the state,170 except to the extent that remedies under state 
law, when coupled with compensation under CERCLA, amount to a 
double recovery.171 
A party need not be both an owner and an operator of a facility to 
incur liability under CERCLA.I72 In fact, the term "owner" has been 
construed to encompass a bank that purchased at a foreclosure sale prop-
ENV'T CODE ANN. § 7-223(d)(2) (1987) (requiring the State Hazardous Substance 
Response Plan, supra note 113, to be consistent with the national contingency plan). 
167. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & 
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982) 
(authorizing the Attorney General to bring abatement actions); 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9659(a) (West Supp. 1988) (authorizing citizens' suits); id. § 9623 (authorizing 
local governments to seek reimbursement from federal government for local 
responses). 
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). The term "Fund" or "Trust Fund" as 
used in CERCLA refers to the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under 
article 26, section 9507 of the United States Code. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. IV 
1986). 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1988). The following parties are subject to 
liability for cleanup costs and other response and remedial costs incurred by a gov-
ernmental or private entity with respect to a facility from which there is a release or 
threatened release of hazardous substances: (1) the "owner and operator" of the 
facility; (2) anyone who owned or operated such facility when hazardous substances 
were disposed there; (3) anyone owning or possessing hazardous substances and 
who arranged for their disposal at, or transport to, such facility; and (4) anyone 
accepting hazardous substances for transport to such facility. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9607(a)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1988). 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1982). 
171. [d. § 9614(b). This provision corresponds to section 7-220(b)(1) of the Environment 
article of the Maryland Annotated Code, which provides for state Superfund financ-
ing "to the extent the costs are not reimbursable under the federal act," and with 
section 7-222(b) of the same article, which provides that the Department of the 
Environment "in any removal or remedial action under this subtitle may not dupli-
cate removal or remedial actions taken under the federal act." MD. ENV'T CODE 
ANN. §§ 7-220(b)(1), 7-222(b) (1987). 
172. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Md. 1986). 
The source of ambiguity in CERCLA with respect to whether a person must be 
both owner and operator of a facility in order to incur liability is the language of 
section 9607(a)(1), which imposes liability on "the owner and operator of ... a 
facility." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). Arguably, 
if Congress had meant "the owner and the operator," it would have employed such 
phraseology. Adding to the ambiguity is the language of definitional section 
9601(20)(A), which states, "The term 'owner or operator' means ... in the case of 
an onshore facility ... any person owning or operating such facility .... " 42 
U.S.C.A. 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). The phrase "owner 
and operator," by negative implication, might have a different meaning from the 
phrase "owner or operator," which is used elsewhere in CERCLA. See, e.g., 42 
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erty on which hazardous wastes have been dumped.173 Whether the 
term "owner" is intended also to encompass mortgagees who are treated 
under state law as holding legal title is unsettled. 174 The Congressional 
intent, however, was to establish a broad focus of liability for cleanup 
costs under CERCLA.175 
Among the defenses available to a CERCLA defendant, perhaps the 
most significant in terms of demonstrating this intended broad focus of 
CERCLA liability is the "third party" defense, whereby the defendant 
must prove that: (1) the actual or threatened release was caused solely by 
the act or omission of a third party; (2) the defendant exercised reason-
able care with respect to the substance; and (3) the defendant took pre-
cautions against foreseeable acts or omissions by such third party. 176 
This is an affirmative defense 177 that requires the defendant, who is 
otherwise strictly liable,178 to disprove his liability by a preponderance of 
the evidence once the government has made a prima facie showing that 
the defendant is within the class of persons subject to liability.179 The 
government need not establish the defendant's failure to exercise reason-
able care, nor must it establish that the actual or threatened release was 
caused by an act or omission of the defendant. 
Several significant procedural rules govern CERCLA litigation. 
First, CERCLA provides for joint and several liability unless the defend-
ants meet the burden of establishing a basis for apportionment under 
principles offederal common law. 180 Second, a three-year statute oflimi-
U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(c)(l), (h), 9608(a)(I) (West Supp. 1988) (all using the phrase 
"owner or operator"). 
173. See Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 577-80. 
174. As originally enacted, section 9601(20)(A) expressly excluded "a person, who, with-
out participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership 
primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility" from the definition of 
"owner or operator." See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). Through this exclusion, 
Congress intended to protect banks that hold mortgages in jurisdictions governed by 
the common law of mortgages. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 580. 
The current definition of "owner or operator" contains no such exclusionary lan-
guage. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1988). 
175. See Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 578 ("An examination of the 
legislative history ... convinces the Court to interpret the language of [the section 
imposing liability] broadly .... "). 
176. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(b)(3) (1982) (discussed in Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. 
Supp. at 581). 
177. 632 F. Supp. at 581. 
178. See United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986). 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). 
180. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. at 450; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f) (West Supp. 1988) (set-
ting forth entitlement to, and procedure for, contribution among parties held liable, 
which suggests that defendants are jointly and severally liable). CERCLA differs in 
this respect from Maryland's Superfund legislation, which provides that in an action 
to recover response costs, the state "shall seek recovery against all responsible per-
sons" and "on an apportionment basis in accordance with a person's contribution to 
the situation or problem, when there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of a responsible person." MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 7-221(b)(2)(i)-(ii) 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
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tations applies to "claims" under CERCLA.181 This three-year limita-
tion, however, does not apply to suits for reimbursement of response 
costS.182 Further, when the United States brings suit in its sovereign ca-
pacity, the doctrine of laches does not apply. 183 Third, because suits for 
reimbursement under CERCLA are deemed to be equitable in nature, no 
right to a jury trial exists. 184 Fourth, because such reimbursement is 
characterized as equitable relief, a liability insurer has no duty to defend 
a CERCLA suit for such relief against the insured where the policy lim-
its the insurer's duty to defend to suits for "damages."185 Finally, the 
federal government obtains an automatic lien upon all real property that 
is subject to or affected by cleanup or remedial action and upon real 
property that belongs to the person held liable in the CERCLA suit. 186 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This comment has set forth the principal federal, state, and local 
statutory provisions that affect nonhazardous solid and hazardous waste 
management in Maryland and has explored how the provisions imposed 
by each governmental level interact. The manner in which control of 
nonhazardous solid waste has developed in the state of Maryland reflects 
a trend away from local land use measures and toward comprehensive 
regional and state management with federal funding, approval, and 
guidelines. Local management of nonhazardous solid waste, however, is 
still a vital component of the overall regulatory scheme. Conversely, 
hazardous waste management is systematized chiefly by federal legisla-
tion, which is either mimicked or implemented by state legislation. Cur-
rently, the most formidable element of the federal hazardous waste 
regulatory scheme is CERCLA, particularly with respect to its aggres-
sive and far-reaching enforcement provisions. 
Lisa Huffman 
181. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1982). 
182. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. at 450-51; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(2) (West Supp. 
1988) (providing limitations periods for civil actions under CERCLA for reimburse-
ment of response costs as follows: (1) for remedial action - within six years after 
initiation of physical on-site construction of such remedial action, and (2) for re-
moval action - within three years after completion of removal, within six years 
after a presidential determination that continued response action is necessary, or if 
remedial action is initiated within three years after completion of removal action, 
under limitations period for remedial action). 
183. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. at 451. 
184. [d. at 453. . 
185. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'g, 643 F. 
Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986). 
186. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(1)(1) (West Supp. 1988). Such a lien arises either when re-
sponse costs are incurred or when written notice of potential liability is provided to 
the person held liable, whichever occurs later. [d. § 9607(1)(2). The lien continues 
until the liability is satisfied or until the statute of limitations has run. [d. 
